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  This paper examines the ultimatum game preceded by a single player’s investment 
decision that is risky in that the business opportunity could fail to be discovered. The 
experiment’s results show that the functioning of social preference connecting the baseline 
ultimatum game with the investment crucially depends on the model’s specifications, such as 
whether the proposer or the responder is the investor or the riskiness of the investment. The 
noninvestor/proposer tends to act in consideration of the efficiency of the investment, but not its 
riskiness. Such tendencies of the noninvestor’s/proposer’s social preferences are diametrically 
opposite to that of the investor/proposer. 
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1. Introduction 
   
  This paper examines a two-person strategic situation; the baseline ultimatum game, 
where a player as proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer on the share of a fixed pie to 
the other player, and the other player as responder decides whether to accept or reject 
his/her offer, is preceded by the stage at which either the proposer or the responder 
makes a relation-specific investment. The description of the model is framed for joint 
ventures where investment provides the business opportunity to bring about a positive 
profit, the pie to be divided between the investor and the noninvestor if each other agree 
about a way to distribute it. 
The purpose of this paper is to clarify how the introduction of the investment 
decision influences the players’ behavioral pattern in the baseline ultimatum game; in 
particular, we focus on how the player’s behavioral patterns change depending on 
whether the investor is the proposer or the responder, or whether the investment 
involves riskiness in the sense that the business opportunity fails to be discovered even 
if the investor makes a positive investment decision. 
In the study of the baseline ultimatum game and its variants, it is necessary to 
consider that the players do not make their decisions on self-interested motives. In this 
respect, we demonstrate an experimental approach; we make clear the different types of 
subjects’ motives that can be supported by the experimental data obtained in 
laboratories. 
With the assumption of a self-interested motive, subgame perfection predicts that 
the responder never rejects any positive offer and the proposer makes a null offer. If the 
investor is not the proposer, this investor is negative against making a positive 3 
 
investment; since the investment is sunk, the noninvestor/proposer has the higher 
bargaining power to claim a larger share of the profit opportunistically, letting the 
investor’s will to invest decline. This case corresponds to the so-called hold-up problem, 
which has long been examined in contract theory literature. See Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian (1978); Grout (1984); Williamson (1985); Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart 
(1995); and Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), for instance. On the other hand, if the 
investor is the proposer, he/she is willing to make the full investment; the tide is turned 
and he/she can enjoy an advantageous position in the negotiation with the noninvestor. 
Several experimental researches, however, report that in contrast with these 
predictions, the subjects in laboratories are motivated not only by their self-interest but 
also by social preferences such as fairness and reciprocity; the responders tend to reject 
ungenerous offers and the proposers tend to make their offers generous in the baseline 
ultimatum game. See Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) and Camerer (2003, 
Chapter 2), for instance. Moreover, several experimental researches on models such as 
the trust game and gift exchange report that positive reciprocity functions in ways such 
that a player’s generous activity at an early stage induces the other player’s altruistic 
response at a later stage. See Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995); Fehr and Gächter 
(2000); and Camerer (2003, Chapter 2), for instance. 
Based on these experimental researches, the subjects in laboratories are anticipated 
to act in consideration of the fact that it is impossible to discover the business 
opportunity as long as the investor makes the null investment. Hence, in our model, 
social preference is anticipated to function as a remedy for the hold-up problem caused 
by the noninvestor’s/proposer’s opportunism. 
The present paper experimentally shows the manner of the functioning of social 4 
 
preference depending on the model’s specifications such as whether the investor or the 
noninvestor is the proposer, whether the investment is risky or not, and the extent of 
investment efficiency. We classify the social preference that connects the baseline 
ultimatum game with the investment decision into two criteria, namely, the investor’s 
privilege and the libertarian doctrine. Because only the investor has the decisive power 
to discover the business opportunity, he/she should have the privilege of obtaining a 
larger share of the pie than the noninvestor. The consideration of the investor’s privilege 
is anticipated to be probably enhanced if the investment becomes risky. Moreover, it 
should be fair, according to the libertarian doctrine, to let the noninvestor bear a part of 
the investor’s monetary cost of investing, even if this cost is sunk. According to this 
doctrine, subjects are sensitive to investment efficiency in the sense that the less 
efficient the investment is, the greater is the share that the investor obtains. 
In addition, because of the presence of riskiness, the investor’s intrinsic burden 
would be substantially higher than the monetary cost. Hence, it should be fair, according 
to the libertarian doctrine, to let the noninvestor bear a part of the investor’s burden 
caused by this riskiness. Based on this doctrine, subjects might be sensitive to this 
riskiness in the sense that the riskier the investment is, the greater is the share that the 
investor obtains. 
  The main experimental results of this paper are as follows. When the noninvestor is 
the proposer, the mean offer in the ultimatum game with no-risk investment is more 
generous than that in the baseline ultimatum game, and it is sensitive to the investment 
efficiency; the noninvestor/proposer tends to be motivated by the libertarian doctrine in 
terms of monetary cost as well as the investor’s privilege. These results support the 
conjecture that social preference functions as a remedy for the hold-up problem. 5 
 
More importantly, when the noninvestor is the proposer and the investment is not 
extremely risky, the mean offer in the ultimatum game with risky investment is almost 
the same as that in the ultimatum game with no-risk investment. This implies that the 
noninvestor/proposer has a tendency not to act in consideration of the riskiness; he/she 
is not motivated on average by either the libertarian doctrine in terms of riskiness or the 
investor’s enhanced privilege. 
The hypothetical explanation on this result could be as follows. It is implicit to 
assume that the investor has no option to negotiate with the noninvestor about the way 
of sharing the investor’s burden if the business opportunity fails to be discovered. In this 
case, the noninvestor’s/proposer’s more-generous offer can be regarded as his/her 
intention of sharing this burden even if the business opportunity fails to be discovered. 
However, it might be hard for the noninvestor/proposer to really have such a lasting 
intention as the noninvestor dislikes compensating the investor for damage that will 
occur when the business opportunity fails to be discovered. 
  On the other hand, when the riskiness in the investment is extremely severe, the 
tide is turned and the noninvestor/proposer in the laboratory is quite positive about 
considering the riskiness and he/she tends to make a much more generous offer in the 
ultimatum game with an extremely risky investment than in the ultimatum game with a 
no-risk investment. 
  The experimental results of this paper also show that the functioning of social 
preference substantially changes when the investor replaces the noninvestor as the 
proposer. The mean offer by the investor/proposer in the ultimatum game with no-risk 
investment is insensitive to the investment efficiency; the investor/proposer has no 
tendency on average to be motivated by the libertarian doctrine in terms of monetary 6 
 
cost. Moreover, the mean offer by the investor/proposer is less generous in the 
ultimatum game with risky investment than in the ultimatum game with no-risk 
investment, as the investor/proposer has a tendency on average to be motivated by the 
investor’s enhanced privilege. These tendencies are diametrically opposite to the 
noninvestor’s/proposer’s tendencies. 
The experimental results of this paper support that the responder generally tends to 
behave on the basis of social preference that is compatible with the proposer’s motive. 
The seminal work by Hackett (1994), which appears to be the first contribution in 
experimental economics to investigate the hold-up problem or generally the bargaining 
problem preceded by the investment decisions, is closely related to, but substantially 
different from, the present paper. Hackett formulated a two-person multistage game in 
which both players make relation-specific investments at the earliest stage, and then 
they play a version of alternating offer bargaining with a positive probability of 
breakdown. Hackett showed that social preference mitigates the hold-up problem by 
comparing a case where the investments are observable with a case where the 
investments are not.
3  In contrast to Hackett, the present paper formulates the bargaining 
procedure as the baseline ultimatum game, assumes that either one of the two players 
makes the investment decision, and compares various modifications of the ultimatum 
game that are distinguished by either having a stage of taking an investment decision or 
not, assuming the investor to be the proposer or responder, or having an element of 
riskiness in the investment or not. 
Based on the experimental results of this paper, we can argue that it depends on the 
model specifications what kind of investment technology the investor prefers, provided 
                                                 
3 See also Gantner, Güth, and Konigstein (2001); Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a, b); Fehr 
and Schmidt (2003); and Fehr, Kremhelmer, and Schmidt (2008). 7 
 
he/she can select any investment technology beforehand. When the investor has a 
disadvantageous position such as that of a responder in negotiation with the noninvestor, 
the investor is negative about enhancing the investment efficiency, and prefers either a 
no-risk or an extremely high-risk technology. This is in sharp contrast with the case 
where the investor has an advantageous position such as that of a proposer in a 
negotiation and he/she takes a positive attitude toward the enhancement of the 
investment efficiency and prefers an investment technology that involves medium risk 
rather than a no-risk or high-risk investment technology. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 specifies the models of the 
baseline ultimatum game and its variants. Section 3 explains the features of the design 
for the experiments conducted for this paper. Section 4 shows the main experimental 
results, which concern the dependence of the mean offer on the model’s specifications. 
Section 5 shows further experimental results. Section 6 argues about the investor’s 
selection of investment technology. 
 8 
 
2. Variants of the Ultimatum Game 
 
2.1. Baseline Ultimatum Game (Game B) 
 
 The  baseline ultimatum game (game B) is defined as a two-stage game played by a 
proposer and a responder. At stage 1, the proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
[0,1] s  to the responder to divide some amount of the pie  0 M  . At stage 2, the 
responder decides whether to accept or reject his/her offer. If the responder accepts it, 
he/she earns  sM  and the proposer earns  (1 ) sM  . If the responder rejects it, both 
obtain nothing from this pie. The self-interested payoff for the proposer is defined as 
    (1 ) H sM      if the responder accepts, 
   H      if  the  responder  rejects, 
whereas the self-interested payoff for the responder is defined as 
   H sM        if the responder accepts, 
   H      if  the  responder  rejects.
4 
In the experiments, the description of game B was framed for the situation where the 
players face a business opportunity that brings about the pie  M , if and only if each 
other agree about a way of the distribution. 
  It is clear that there exists the unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium 
where the proposer makes the null offer  0 s   and the responder accepts any offer. 
However, it is an accepted view in experimental economics that the subjects are 
motivated by not only their self-interests but also their social preferences; in 
laboratories, the responder tends to reject ungenerous offers and the proposer tends to 
                                                 
4  Each player can earn a fixed amount  0 H    even if the offer is rejected. 9 
 
make a generous offer. 
 
2.2. Ultimatum Game with No-Risk Investment (Games PI and RI) 
 
 The  ultimatum game with no-risk investment is defined as a three-stage game in 
which the baseline ultimatum game is preceded by a stage at which either the proposer 
or the responder makes a relation-specific investment decision. At stage 0, the investor 
decides how much he/she makes for a quantity of investment  [0, ] hH   that is 
observable to the other player (noninvestor). At stages 1 and 2, they play the baseline 
ultimatum game, where the investment decision h  at stage 0, along with the 
investment efficiency given by  0   , induces the business opportunity with certainty 
that brings about the pie  M h   , if and only if the responder accepts the proposer’s 
offer. 
  The ultimatum game with no-risk investment is divided into two cases; the first 
case is called the ultimatum game with proposer’s investment (game PI), where the 
investor is assumed to be the proposer. The second case is called the ultimatum game 
with responder’s investment ( game RI), where the investor is assumed to be the 
responder. 
In game PI, the self-interested payoff for the investor/proposer is defined as 
    (1 ) H hs h     if the noninvestor/responder accepts, 
   H h      if  the  noninvestor/responder rejects, 
whereas the self-interested payoff for the noninvestor/responder is defined as 
   H sh        if the noninvestor/responder accepts, 
   H      if  the  noninvestor/responder rejects. 10 
 
There exists the unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where the 
investor/proposer makes the full investment  hH  , he/she makes the null offer  0 s   
at all times, and the responder accepts any offer. 
  We conjecture that in laboratories, the subjects behave in a different manner; 
because of social preferences, the investor/proposer tends to make a less-generous offer 
in game PI than in game B, and the noninvestor/responder is more likely to accept an 
ungenerous offer in game PI than in game B. 
There are two reasons why the subjects tend to behave in this manner. First, 
because only the investor has the decisive power to discover the business opportunity, 
he/she should have the privilege of obtaining a larger share of the pie compared to the 
noninvestor. Second, it should be fair, according to the libertarian doctrine, to let the 
noninvestor bear a part of the investor’s monetary cost of investing  h. Based on this 
doctrine, the subjects are anticipated to be sensitive to the investment efficiency    in 
that as    decreases, that is, as the investment becomes less efficient, the 
investor/proposer tends to make his/her offer less generous, and the 
noninvestor/responder becomes more likely to accept ungenerous offers. 
  In game RI, where the investor is the responder, the self-interested payoff for the 
noninvestor/proposer is defined as 
    (1 ) H sh      if the investor/responder accepts, 
   H      if  the  investor/responder  rejects, 
whereas the self-interested payoff for the investor/responder is defined as 
   H hs h       if the investor/responder accepts, 
   H h        if the investor/responder rejects. 
There exists the unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where the 11 
 
investor/responder makes the null investment  0 h  , the noninvestor/proposer makes 
the null offer  0 s   at all times, and the investor/responder accepts any offer. In a 
similar manner to game PI, we conjecture that in laboratories, the noninvestor/proposer 
tends to make a more-generous offer in game RI than in game B, and the 
investor/responder is less likely to accept ungenerous offers in game RI than in game B. 
Moreover, the subjects are anticipated to be sensitive to the investment efficiency     in 
that as    decreases, that is, as the investment becomes less efficient, the 
noninvestor/proposer tends to make his/her offer more generous, and the 
investor/responder becomes more likely to reject ungenerous offers. 
 
2.3. Ultimatum Games with Risky Investment 
(Games PRI and RRI) 
 
The ultimatum game with risky investment is defined as a modification of the 
ultimatum game with no-risk investment; there is riskiness in the investment as follows. 
With a positive probability  (0,1] p , the investment decision  h  at stage 0 succeeds in 
discovering the business opportunity  M h   , and the players come into stages 1 and 2 
to play the baseline ultimatum game. With the remaining probability 1 p  , however, 
the business opportunity fails to be discovered, and the game ends. 
  The ultimatum game with risky investment is divided into two cases; the first case 
is called the ultimatum game with the proposer’s risky investment (game PRI), where the 
investor is assumed to be the proposer. The second case is called the ultimatum game 
with the responder’s risky investment (game RRI), where the investor is assumed to be 
the responder. 12 
 
In game PRI, the self-interested payoff for the investor/proposer is defined as 
    (1 ) H hs h     if the business opportunity is discovered and the 
noninvestor/responder accepts, 
   H h      if  either  the  business opportunity fails to be 
discovered or the noninvestor/responder rejects, 
whereas the self-interested payoff for the responder is specified as 
   H sh        if the business opportunity is discovered and the 
noninvestor/responder accepts, 
   H      if  either  the  business opportunity fails to be 
discovered or the noninvestor/responder rejects. 
We assume that the investment efficiency in expectation, defined as  p  , is greater than 
unity, that is,  1 p   . On the risk-neutrality assumption, there exists the unique pure 
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where the investor/proposer makes the full 
investment  hH  , he/she makes the null offer  0 s    at all times, and the 
noninvestor/responder accepts any offer. 
  Because of social preferences, we conjecture that in laboratories, the 
investor/proposer tends to make a less-generous offer in game PRI than in game PI, and 
the noninvestor/responder is more likely to accept ungenerous offers in game PRI than 
in game PI. 
There are two reasons why the players tend to behave differently in game PRI than 
in game PI. First, the consideration of the investor’s privilege may be enhanced by 
introducing riskiness in the investment. Second, because of the presence of riskiness, 
the investor’s/proposer’s intrinsic burden induced by the investment decision at stage 0 
would be substantially higher than its monetary cost  h. Therefore, according to the 13 
 
libertarian doctrine, it would be fair to let the noninvestor/responder bear even a part of 
the investor’s/proposer’s burden caused by this riskiness. Based on this doctrine, the 
subjects are anticipated to be sensitive to the probability  p  of  discovering  the  business 
opportunity; as  p  decreases, the investor/proposer tends to make his/her offer less 
generous, and the noninvestor/responder becomes more likely to accept ungenerous 
offers. 
  In game RRI, where the investor is the responder, the self-interested payoff for the 
noninvestor/proposer is defined as 
    (1 ) H sh      if the business opportunity is discovered and the 
investor/responder accepts, 
   H      if  either  the  business opportunity fails to be 
discovered or the investor/responder rejects, 
whereas the self-interested payoff for the responder is defined as 
   H hs h       if the business opportunity is discovered and the 
       investor/responder  accepts, 
   H h      if  either  the  business opportunity fails to be 
discovered or the investor/responder rejects. 
On the risk-neutrality assumption, there exists the unique pure strategy subgame perfect 
equilibrium where the investor/responder makes the null investment  0 h  , the 
noninvestor/proposer makes the null offer  0 s    at all times, and the 
investor/responder accepts any offer. In the similar manner to game PRI, we conjecture 
that in laboratories, the noninvestor/proposer tends to make a more-generous offer in 
game RRI than in game RI, and the investor/responder is less likely to accept 
ungenerous offers in game RRI than in game RI. 14 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
  We conducted computerized experiments
5 at the University of Tokyo from 
October 2006 to March 2007, where subjects were recruited from undergraduate and 
graduate schools for all fields. The subjects were well-motivated as they could obtain 
points that were the same amounts as their earned payoffs, which were then converted 
into yen at a fixed rate per point. They also got the participation fee of 1500 yen in 
addition to their earned payoffs. We assumed  30 H  , and the choice of investment  h 
was restricted to  {0,10,20,30}. 
  The experiments were categorized into three types, that is,  (3,0.75),  (5,0.5), and 
(4,0.35), where type  (,) p   implies the investment technology where the investment 
efficiency in games PI, RI, PRI, and RRI, and the probability of discovering the 
business opportunity in games PRI and RRI, are set equal to    and  p , respectively. 
In each type  (,) p  , the pie for the baseline ultimatum game (game B) was given by 
30 M   . 
  Appendix 1 shows the detailed features of our experimental design. Types 
(3,0.75),  (5,0.5), and  (4,0.35)  were conducted on October 25 and 26, 2006; January 
18, 2007; and March 15 and 16, 2007, respectively. On the dates October 25 and 26, 
2006, and January 18, 2007, the subjects played 10, 14, 14, 20, and 20 rounds for the 
treatments for games B, PI, RI, PRI, and RRI, respectively. On the dates March 15 and 
16, 2007, the subjects played 8, 12, 12, 24, and 24 rounds for the treatments for games 
B, PI, RI, PRI, and RRI, respectively. The subjects were randomly paired with each 
other for each round and each subject was fixed to a role for the first half of the rounds 
                                                 
5 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree. See Fischbacher 
(2007). 15 
 
for each treatment; his/her role was changed for the latter half. We replaced the 
treatments in which the investor is the proposer with the treatments in which the 
investor is the responder across the dates. This replacement, however, did not affect the 
experimental results. 
Each subject was handed the experiment manual for instructions about the rules of 
the games and the booklet with printed computer screen images that were written in the 
Japanese language,
6 the contents of which were explained by a recording voice. The 
description of the games in the manual was framed as a strategic interaction where two 
players had claims for the pie. On the screens of the computer, the subjects could always 
see any information necessary for his/her decision making, such as the structure of the 
game and the previous decisions made in the earlier stages in the same round. 
  
                                                 
6  See Appendixes 3 and 4 for the translation of the experiment manual and the computer screen 
images into English. 16 
 
4. Experimental Results: Mean Offers 
 




In game B, irrespective of the type, the mean offer was about 30%. In game PI, 
irrespective of the type, the mean offer was about 5% less than in game B; the 
investor/proposer tended to make a less-generous offer in game PI than in game B. The 
extent to which he/she made the offer less generous was irrelevant to the type, that is, 
the investment efficiency  . Hence, in game PI, the proposer had a tendency on 
average to be motivated by the investor’s privilege, but not by the libertarian doctrine in 
terms of monetary cost. 
In game RI, irrespective of the type, the mean offer was more generous than in 
game B. The extent to which he/she made the offer more generous varied according to 
the type, that is, the investment efficiency   ; the less efficient the investment, the more 
generous the noninvestor’s/proposer’s offer. We can see this tendency also in Appendix 
2. In game RI, irrespective of the type, the mean offer conditional on the positive 
investment  {10, 20, 30} h   was more generous, and the extent to which this 
conditional mean offer was more generous was inversely proportional to the investment 
efficiency   . Hence, in game RI, the proposer had a tendency on average to be 
motivated not only by the investor’s privilege but also by the libertarian doctrine in 
terms of monetary cost. 
In game PRI, irrespective of the type, the mean offer was about 2% less than in 17 
 
game PI; the investor/proposer tended to make a less-generous offer in game PRI than 
in game PI. The extent to which he/she made the offer less generous was irrelevant to 
the type. We can see this tendency also in Appendix 2; the mean offer conditional on the 
positive investment in game PRI was less generous than in game PI at all times, except 
for the pair of type (4,0.35)  and investment  10 h  . Hence, in game PRI, the 
proposer had a tendency on average to be motivated by the investor’s enhanced 
privilege more than in game PI, but not to be motivated by the libertarian doctrine in 
terms of riskiness. 
In game RRI, the mean offer was about the same as in game RI when the type was 
either  (3,0.75) or (5,0.5), that is, when the investment was not extremely risky. We 
can see this tendency also in Appendix 2; the mean offer conditional on the positive 
investment was almost the same as in game RI whenever the type was either  (3,0.75) 
or  (5,0.5). To sum up, in game RRI, as long as the investment was not extremely risky, 
the proposer had a tendency on average not to act in consideration of the riskiness. 
The hypothetical explanation on this result could be as follows. It is implicit in 
game RRI to assume that the investor has no option to negotiate with the noninvestor 
about the way of sharing the investment cost  h if the business opportunity fails to be 
discovered. In this case, the noninvestor’s/proposer’s more-generous offer can be 
regarded as his/her intention of sharing the investment cost  h even if the business 
opportunity fails to be discovered. However, the subjects who play the role of the 
noninvestor/proposer might not really believe such an intention will last as he/she is not 
responsible for this failure, because the investment decision was the 
investor/responder’s alone. Because of this reason, it is natural that the 
noninvestor/proposer dislikes compensating the investor/responder for the damage that 18 
 
will occur if the business opportunity fails to be discovered. 
On the other hand, when the type is (4,0.35), that is, when the investment is 
extremely risky, the mean offer was more generous in game RRI than in game RI. We 
can see this tendency also in Appendix 2; the mean offer conditional on the positive 
investment was generally more generous in game RRI than in game RI when the type 
was  (4,0.35). To sum up, in game RRI, when the investment was extremely risky, the 
proposer had a tendency on average to act in consideration of the riskiness by taking a 
standpoint of either respecting the investor’s enhanced privilege or the libertarian 
doctrine in terms of riskiness. 
 
  19 
 
5. Other Experimental Results 
 
Table 2 shows the mean acceptance rates, that is, the frequency of the responder to 




The mean acceptance rate is the lowest in game B among all the games, is higher 
in game PRI than in game PI, and is higher in game PPI than in game RI. These results 
hold irrespective of the type. Hence, the introduction of the investment decision 
increases the mean acceptance rate, and the introduction of the riskiness further 
increases it. 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the mean acceptance rates conditional on 
the offer. We calculated the conditional mean acceptance rates by dividing the offers 
into 0%, and ranges 1% to 10%, 11% to 20%, 21% to 30%, 31% to 40%, 41% to 50%, 




The conditional mean acceptance rate is generally higher in game PI than in game 
B, and is lower in game RI than in game B, irrespective of the type; the responder has a 
tendency on average to act in consideration of the difference in role between the 
investor and the noninvestor. The conditional mean acceptance rate is generally higher 
in game PRI than in game PI, irrespective of the type; the responder has a tendency on 20 
 
average to act in consideration of the riskiness. 
  When the type is  (4,0.35), that is, the investment is extremely risky, the mean 
acceptance rates conditional on the ranges 11% to 20%, 21% to 30%, and 31% to 40% 
are lower in game RRI than in game RI; the responder has a tendency on average to act 
in consideration of the riskiness. 
  When the type is either (3,0.75)  or  (5,0.5) , that is, the investment is not 
extremely risky, the mean acceptance rates conditional on the ranges 21% to 30% and 
31% to 40% are even higher in game RRI than in game RI; neither the proposer nor the 
responder has a tendency on average to act in consideration of the riskiness. 
  To sum up, we can conclude that in each game, the responder’s behavioral pattern 
tends to be roughly based on the same criteria of social preference as the proposer’s 
behavioral pattern. 




The mean investment is higher in game PI than in game RI, irrespective of the 
type; the investor has a tendency on average to invest more when he/she is the proposer 
rather than the responder. The mean investment is higher in game PI than in game PRI, 
and is higher in game RI than in game RRI, irrespective of the type; the investor has a 
tendency on average to invest more if there is no riskiness rather than otherwise. In 
game PI and game RI, the mean investment is higher when the investment is more 
efficient. In game PRI and game RRI, the higher the mean investment is, the more 
efficient the investment is in expectation. 21 
 
  Table 5 shows the mean payoffs for the proposer and responder for all pairs of the 




Irrespective of whether the game is B, PI, or RI, the more efficient the investment 
is, the higher the proposer’s mean payoff is. This property also holds for the responder’s 
mean payoff. Irrespective of whether the game is PRI or RRI, the more efficient the 
investment is in expectation, the higher the proposer’s mean payoff is. This property 
also holds for the responder’s mean payoff. 
In games B, PI, RI, and RRI, irrespective of the type, the proposer’s mean payoff is 
greater than the responder’s mean payoff. Contrary to these games, in game PRI for 
type  (4,0.35), where the proposer is the investor and the riskiness is extremely severe, 
the investor’s/proposer’s mean payoff is even less than the responder’s mean payoff. 
  In game RRI, irrespective of the type, the investor/responder’s mean payoff is very 
small; for types  (3,0.75) and (4,0.35), it is even smaller than the default payoff 30, 
though the investor/responder’s loss from investment is somewhat made up for by the 
noninvestor’s/proposer’s making of a generous offer. 
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6. Selection of Investment Technology 
 
Based on the experimental results of this paper, we demonstrate the following 
hypotheses on behavioral pattern: 
(1)  Irrespective of whether the investor is the proposer or the responder, the subjects 
are motivated by the investor’s privilege. 
(2)  When the investor is the proposer, the subjects are not motivated by the libertarian 
doctrine in terms of monetary cost. 
(3)  When the investor is the responder, the subjects are motivated by the libertarian 
doctrine in terms of monetary cost. 
(4)  When the investor is the proposer, the consideration of the investor’s privilege is 
enhanced by introducing the riskiness. 
(5)  When the investor is the responder and the investment is not extremely risky, the 
consideration of the investor’s privilege is not enhanced by introducing the 
riskiness. 
(6)  When the investor is the proposer, the subjects are not motivated by the libertarian 
doctrine in terms of riskiness. 
(7)  When the investor is the responder and the investment is not extremely risky, the 
subjects are not motivated by the libertarian doctrine in terms of riskiness. 
(8)  When the investor is the responder and the investment is extremely risky, either the 
consideration of the investor’s privilege is enhanced by introducing the riskiness, 
or the subjects are motivated by the libertarian doctrine in terms of riskiness. 
 
When the investor is the proposer, it follows from hypotheses (2), (4), and (6) that 23 
 
the investor’s/proposer’s offer is independent of the degree of the investment efficiency, 
becomes less generous by introducing the riskiness, and is independent of the degree of 
the riskiness. Hence, we conclude that the investor/proposer prefers selecting a risky 
investment technology given by  (,) p    to its certainty equivalent, a no-risk investment 
technology given by (,) p   where  p     and  1 p , if he/she is permitted to 
select any investment technology beforehand. 
On the other hand, when the investor is the responder and the investment is not 
extremely risky, it follows from hypotheses (3), (5), and (7) that the 
noninvestor’s/proposer’s offer is decreasing in investment efficiency, and that it is 
independent of the element of riskiness. Hence, we conclude that in contrast with the 
investor/proposer, the investor/responder prefers a no-risk investment technology to any 
risky investment technology, and he/she will seriously consider the enhancing of 





Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe (1995): “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,” 
Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122-142. 
Camerer, C. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ellingsen, T. and M. Johannesson (2004a): “Promises, Threats, and Fairness,” 
Economic Journal 114, 397-420. 
Ellingsen, T. and M. Johannesson (2004b): “Is there a Hold-up Problem?” Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 106, 475-494. 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000): “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 159-181. 
Fehr, E., S. Kremhelmer, and K. Schmidt (2008): “Fairness and the Optimal Allocation 
of Ownership Rights,” Economic Journal 118, 1262-1284. 
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (2003): “Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evidence and 
Economic Applications,” in: M. Dewatripont et al. (eds.), Advances in Economic 
Theory, Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society 1, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 208-257. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007): “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic 
Experiments,” Experimental Economics 10(2), 171-178. 
Hackett, S. (1994): “Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and 
Repeated Contact?” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 10, 360-389. 
Hart, O. (1995): Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Holmstrom, B. and J. Roberts (1998): “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 12, 73-94. 25 
 
Klein, B., R. Crawford, and A. Alchian (1978): “Vertical Integration, Appropriable 
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting,” Journal of Law and Economics 21, 
297-326. 
Gantner, A., W. Güth, and M. Konigstein (2001): “Equitable Choices in Bargaining 
Games with Joint Production,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46, 
209-225. 
Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986): “The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 12, 73-94. 
Grout, P. (1984): “Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts: a Nash 
bargaining approach,” Econometrica 52, 449-60. 
Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze (1982): “An Experimental analysis of 
ultimatum bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 367-88. 
Williamson, O. (1985): The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free 
Press. 
 
  26 
 




    (3, 0.75)  (5, 0.5)  (4, 0.35) 
B  0.310   0.294   0.299  
PI  0.251   0.255   0.259  
RI  0.421   0.343   0.379  
PRI  0.228   0.234   0.225  
RRI  0.419   0.349   0.435  
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    (3, 0.75)  (5, 0.5)  (4, 0.35) 
B  0.733   0.807   0.789  
PI  0.849   0.864   0.849  
RI  0.812   0.838   0.856  
PRI  0.887   0.942   0.879  
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Game B: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.016  0.053   0.207  0.200   0.233   0.253  0.011   0.027 




Game B: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5  0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.021   0.114   0.182  0.118 0.357 0.200 0.007    0.000 




Game B: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5  0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.010   0.094   0.188  0.227  0.216 0.232 0.031    0.003 
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Game PI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5  0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.030   0.012   0.258  0.389  0.250 0.034 0.005    0.021 




Game PI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.003  0.069   0.407  0.189   0.315   0.013   0.005   0.000 




Game PI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5  0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.012   0.064   0.223  0.409  0.240 0.040 0.002    0.010 
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Game RI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.020  0.012   0.071  0.073   0.268   0.325   0.090   0.141 




Game RI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5  0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.010   0.039   0.191  0.172  0.295 0.198 0.091    0.003 




Game RI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.011  0.020   0.069  0.236   0.198   0.336   0.047   0.082 
Acceptance Rate  0.167  0.182    0.684  0.715   0.908   0.968   1.000   1.000 
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Game PRI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5  0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.007   0.019   0.356  0.439  0.158 0.014 0.001    0.006 




Game PRI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.003  0.071   0.495  0.210   0.207   0.006   0.006   0.000 




Game PRI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.012  0.097   0.324  0.410   0.118   0.027   0.003   0.009 
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Game RRI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.009  0.004   0.079  0.101   0.285   0.323   0.054   0.144 




Game RRI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5 0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.012  0.016   0.159  0.205   0.395   0.151   0.047   0.016 




Game RRI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Offer  0  0 - 0.1  0.11 - 0.2 0.21 - 0.3 0.31 - 0.4 0.41 - 0.5  0.51 - 0.6  0.61 - 1
Offer Frequency  0.000   0.025   0.035  0.217  0.167 0.359 0.020    0.177 








    (3, 0.75)  (5, 0.5)  (4, 0.35) 
PI  27.9   29.5   29.0  
RI  21.6   26.4   24.4  
PRI  25.2   26.3   14.9  
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Table 5: Mean Payoffs 
 
 
(3, 0.75)  (5, 0.5)  (4, 0.35) 
B Proposer  72.3  111.1  93.8 
Responder 53.7  70.0  60.9 
PI Investor/Proposer 54.2  94.3  72.4 
Noninvestor/Responder 49.1  63.8  57.1 
RI Noninvestor/Proposer  58.5  100.4  79.5 
Investor/Responder 32.6  43.9  39.3 
PRI Investor/Proposer 44.3  59.4  32.1 
Noninvestor/Responder 42.2  47.2  34.9 
RRI Noninvestor/Proposer  44.6  59.5  35.7 




Appendix 1:   




Type  Date  Turn of Games (Round Number)  Number of Subjects  Yen per Point
(3, 0.75) October 25, 2006  B (10), PI (14), RI (14), PRI (20), RRI (20) 26  0.8 
(3, 0.75) October 25, 2006  B (10), PI (14), RI (14), PRI (20), RRI (20) 28  0.8 
(3, 0.75) October 26, 2006  B (10), RI (14), PI (14), RRI (20), PRI (20) 28  0.8 
(3, 0.75) October 26, 2006  B (10), RI (14), PI (14), RRI (20), PRI (20) 28  0.8 
(5, 0.5)  January 18, 2007  B (10), PI (14), RI (14), PRI (20), RRI (20) 28  0.7 
(5, 0.5)  January 18, 2007  B (10), RI (14), PI (14), RRI (20), PRI (20) 28  0.7 
(4, 0.35)  March 15, 2007 B (8), PI (12), RI (12), PRI (24), RRI (24) 22  0.9 
(4, 0.35)  March 15, 2007 B (8), PI (12), RI (12), PRI (24), RRI (24) 26  0.9 
(4, 0.35)  March 16, 2007 B (8), RI (12), PI (12), RRI (24), PRI (24) 22  0.9 
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Appendix 2 (1): 





Game PI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.013  -  -  - 
10    0.036  1.000  0.275  0.786 
20    0.101  1.000  0.258  0.821 




Game PI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.003    -  -  - 
10    0.018    1.000    0.286    0.714   
20    0.010    1.000    0.325    1.000   




Game PI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.002    -  -  - 
10    0.010    1.000    0.188    0.667   
20    0.076    1.000    0.264    0.864   
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Appendix 2 (2): 





Game RI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.108    -  -  - 
10    0.147    1.000    0.434    0.832   
20    0.223    1.000    0.421    0.779   




Game RI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.023    -  -  - 
10    0.069    1.000    0.367    0.852   
20    0.153    1.000    0.309    0.817   




Game RI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0  0.045    -  -  - 
10  0.090    1.000    0.368    0.827   
20  0.248    1.000    0.383    0.909   
30  0.616    1.000    0.379    0.839   
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Appendix 2 (3): 





Game PRI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.045    -  -  - 
10    0.100    0.664  0.263    0.904   
20    0.142    0.763  0.235    0.908   




Game PRI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.077    -  -  - 
10    0.070    0.564    0.264    0.955   
20    0.071    0.575    0.248    0.957   




Game PRI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0  0.323    -  -  - 
10  0.207    0.456    0.270    0.927   
20  0.129    0.463    0.226    0.899   
30  0.340    0.411    0.194    0.839   
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Appendix 2 (4): 





Game RRI: Type (3, 0.75) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.323    -  -  - 
10    0.174    0.660  0.411    0.810   
20    0.226    0.735  0.423    0.858   




Game RRI: Type (5, 0.5) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0    0.263    -  -  - 
10    0.180    0.634    0.353    0.875   
20    0.125    0.586    0.357    0.854   




Game RRI: Type (4, 0.35) 
 
 
Investment  Investment Frequency  Success Frequency  Mean Offer Acceptance Rate 
0  0.500    -  -  - 
10  0.246    0.339    0.447    0.896   
20  0.118    0.346    0.428    0.872   
30  0.136    0.350    0.418    0.836   
 




(October 25–26, 2006, Translation from Japanese into English) 
 
Thank you very much for participating in the experiments today. Please check the contents 
of the envelope and the items that have been distributed. The list of distributed items consists of: 
1. Ballpoint pen - 1 
2. Experiment manual - 1 copy 
3. Booklet with printed computer screen images - 1 copy 
4. Bank remittance form - 1 sheet 
5. Memo paper - 1 sheet 
  If any of the distributed items are missing, please quietly raise your hand. The distributed 
items will be collected after the experiments, except for the memo paper, which you can take 
with you. 
Please look at the experiment manual. You will be asked to make selections on a computer 
terminal and depending on the results, you will be awarded “points.” These points will be 
converted into funds at an exchange rate of 0.8 yen per point, which will be paid to you as 
compensation, in addition to the participation fee of 1,500 yen. Therefore, the amount of money 
you will receive from these experiments will be:   
 
Total number of points awarded  ×  0.8 yen + participation fee of 1,500 yen 
  
Please do not speak to or exchange signals with anyone during the experiments, or you 
may be asked to leave. Furthermore, you will not be allowed to leave during the experiments, 
except under unavoidable circumstances. Please turn off your cell phones during the 
experiments. Also, do not perform any operation on the computer unless it is in the experiment 
manual or you have been instructed to do so. If you have any questions, please quietly raise 
your hand and the administrative staff will respond to you.   
 
Summary of experiments 
 
We will conduct 5 experiments today, which are all independent from each other and the 
results of one experiment will not have any impact on the others. You will be asked to make the 
selections described below multiple times, during each experiment. We shall refer to these 
frequencies as “Round 1,” “Round 2,” “Round 3,” and so forth. Points will be determined for 
each of these rounds.   41 
 
You will be assigned the role of either “Player 1” or “Player 2” and an equal number of 
people will be divided into either of these roles. “Player 1” and “Player 2” will be paired up to 
make decisions. People will be paired up randomly by the computer and these pairs will be 
changed for each round. All your interactions during the experiments will be conducted through 
the computer terminals and will be recorded. 




Experiment 1 comprises 10 Rounds and each Round will proceed in the following manner: 
Player 1 selects an integer, Integer X, from integers 0 to 90. Player 2 observes Integer X, then 
selects either A or R. When A is selected:   
Player 1 is awarded        X + 30     points. 
Player 2 is awarded        90 – X + 30    points. 
When R is selected:   
Both players are awarded      30      points. 
Please consider that you are facing the following situation: Both “Player 1” and “Player 2” 
already have 30 points each. Furthermore, there is a joint project, which if executed, may entitle 
you to a total of 90 additional points. Player 1 indicates Proposal X to Player 2, which provides 
X points to Player 1 and the remaining 90 – X points to Player 2. Player 2 either accepts 
Proposal X (A) or rejects (R) it. If the proposal is accepted (A), the joint project will be 
executed and the 90 points will be distributed as indicated by the Proposal X; if rejected (R), the 
joint project will not be executed and the 90 points will not be added. Look at the following 

















Player 1    X + 30     points   
Player  2  90－X + 30   points 
Player 1    30     points 











and you will remain in that role to make decisions until the first 5 rounds have been completed. 
Then the players will switch roles and the person who was Player 1 becomes Player 2, and vice 
versa, and the decision making proceeds with these switched roles for the next 5 rounds. Please 
note that the partner you are paired up with will be selected randomly and change for each 
round. 
Those who have any questions, please quietly raise your hand. 
 
Description of screen displays and operations for computers 
 
Please look at the booklet with printed computer screen images.   
Please look at Screen 1, which shows whether you are to be Player 1 or Player 2 at the 
beginning of Round 1. In this example, it shows that you are Player 1. After 3 seconds, the 
display automatically moves onto the next screen. 
Please look at Screen 2 where Player 1 selects a number for X, which is displayed on the 
upper left section of the screen. In this example, it shows that a decision is currently being made 
for Round 2. An archive of the previous rounds, including the value of X that Player 1 selected 
and the A or R selection chosen by Player 2, is displayed on the left side of the screen. In this 
example, 50 for X and A has been chosen. The lower right section of the screen is the location 
for decision-making operations. Enter Integer X inside the frame of the box for an entry using 
single-byte numbers and click the OK button. The amount of time allowed for making a 
decision is 18 seconds, so please make your entry before the remaining time displayed at the 
upper right section of the screen becomes 0. While Player 1 is making a decision, a standby 
screen is displayed for Player 2. 
Please look at Screen 3, where Player 2 can select either A or R. The number of the round is 
displayed on the upper left section of the screen, an archive of previous rounds is displayed on 
the left side of the screen, and the value of X selected by Player 1 for the current Round is 
shown on the right side of the screen. In this example, the value 65 has been selected for X. 
Click to select either A or R, and then the OK button at the lower right section within the 
stipulated time of 18 seconds. While Player 2 is making a decision, a standby screen is 
displayed for Player 1. 
Please look at Screen 4 where the points awarded to you from this round are displayed. In 
this example, the screen indicates that you are Player 2 and your partner, Player 1, has selected 
the value 65 for X and you have chosen A. Therefore, you are awarded 90 – X + 30 = 90 – 65 + 
30 = 55 points, while your partner is awarded X + 30 = 65 + 30 = 95 points. After 5 seconds, the 
display automatically moves onto the next round and the roles of the players are reassigned.   
Please look at Screen 5, which shows the switched roles. Player 1 now becomes Player 2 43 
 
and vice versa. In this example, it shows that your role was previously that of Player 1, but it 
has now switched to Player 2. After 3 seconds, the display automatically moves onto the next 
screen.  




Experiment 2 comprises of 14 Rounds, and each Round will proceed in the following 
manner: Player 1 selects an integer, Integer H, from among 4 available integers 0, 10, 20, and 30. 
Player 1 then selects an integer, Integer X, from integers 0 to 3H. Player 2 observes Integer X, 
then selects either A or R. When A is selected: 
Player 1 is awarded      X + 30 – H   points.   
Player 2 is awarded      3H – X + 30    points.  
When R is selected:   
Player 1 is awarded        30 – H    points.   
Player 2 is awarded      30     points.   
  Please consider that you are facing the following situation: Both “Player 1” and “Player 2” 
already have 30 points each. Player 1 will discover that there is a joint project and if executed 
with an investment of H points, there is a prospect of gaining a total of 3H points. Player 1 
indicates Proposal X to Player 2 for the distribution of the 3H points, which provides X points 
to Player 1 and the remaining 3H –X points to Player 2. Player 2 either accepts Proposal X (A) 
or rejects (R) it. If the proposal is accepted (A), the joint project will be executed and the 3H 
points will be distributed as indicated by Proposal X; if rejected (R), the joint project will not be 
executed and the 3H points will not be added. Look at the following diagram to verify how the 
points are awarded. The investment of H points is deducted from the points awarded to Player 1, 







Player 1    30 – H  points 





























Player 1    X + 30－H   points 
Player 2    3H – X + 30    points 44 
 
As soon as the experiment starts, you will be assigned the role of either Player 1 or Player 2, 
and you will remain in that role to make decisions until the first 7 rounds have been completed. 
Then the players will switch roles and the person who was Player 1 becomes Player 2, and vice 
versa. The players proceed with decision making in these switched roles for the next 7 rounds. 
Please note that the partner you are paired up with will be selected randomly and change for 
each round.   
Those who have any questions, please quietly raise your hand.   
 
Description of screen displays and operations for computers 
 
Please look at the booklet with printed computer screen images.   
Please look at Screen 6 where Player 1 selects a number for H. The lower right section of 
the screen is the location for decision-making operations. Click to select one integer from 
among 0, 10, 20, and 30, and then the OK button within the stipulated time of 18 seconds.   
Please look at Screen 7 where Player 1 selects a number for X. The value of H selected by 
Player 1 for the current Round is shown on the right side of the screen. In this example, the 
value selected for H is 20; therefore, the additional points for the joint project are 3H = 60 
points. Enter Integer X inside the frame of the box for entries using single-byte numbers 
between 0 and 60 and click OK within the stipulated time of 18 seconds. 
Please look at Screen 8 where Player 2 selects either A or R. Values of H and X selected by 
Player 1 for the current Round are shown on the right side of the screen. In this example, H is 
20 and X is 45; therefore, if A is selected, Player 1 will be awarded X + 30 – H = 45 + 30 – 20 = 
55 points, while Player 2 will be awarded 3H – X + 30 = 60 – 45 + 30 = 45 points. Click to 
select either A or R and then click OK within the stipulated time of 18 seconds. 
The points awarded to you for the Round are displayed on a screen similar to Screen 4 for 5 
seconds before the screen moves onto the next Round. 




Experiment 3 comprises 14 Rounds and each Round will proceed in the following manner: 
Player 1 selects an integer, Integer H, from among 4 available integers 0, 10, 20, and 30. Next, 
Player 2 selects an integer, Integer Y, from integers 0 to 3H. Player 1 observes Integer Y, then 
selects either A or R. When A is selected: 
Player 1 is awarded      3H – Y + 30 – H points.   
Player 2 is awarded      Y + 30        points.  45 
 
  When R is selected:   
Player 1 is awarded      30 – H    points.  
Player 2 is awarded      30    points.   
  Please consider that you are facing the following situation: Both “Player 1” and “Player 2” 
already have 30 points each. Player 1 will discover that there is a joint project and if executed 
with an investment of H points, there is a prospect of gaining a total of 3H points. Player 2 
indicates Proposal Y for the distribution of the 3H points, which provides Y points to Player 2 
and the remaining 3H – Y points to Player 1. Note that it is not Player 1 who spent the awarded 
points for H points, but Player 2 who makes the proposal. Player 1 either accepts Proposal Y (A) 
or rejects (R) it. If the proposal is accepted (A), the joint project will be executed and the points 
will be distributed as indicated by Proposal Y. If the proposal is rejected (R), the joint project 
will not be executed. Look at the following diagram to verify how the points are awarded. The 
investment of H points is deducted from the points awarded to Player 1, regardless of whether 
or not the joint project is executed.   
 
 
As soon as the experiment starts, you will be assigned the role of either Player 1 or Player 2, 
and you will remain in that role to make decisions until the first 7 rounds have been completed. 
Then the players will switch roles and the person who was Player 1 becomes Player 2, and vice 
versa. The players proceed with decision making in these switched roles for the next 7 rounds. 
Please note that the partner you are paired up with will be selected randomly and change in each 
round.  




Experiment 4 comprises 20 Rounds and each Round will proceed in the following manner. 
Player 1 selects an integer, Integer H, from among 4 available integers 0, 10, 20, and 30. Once 




Player 1    3H – Y + 30 – H  points
Player 2    Y + 30      points
Player 1    30 – H  points 






























Player 1 is awarded      30 – H   points.   
Player 2 is awarded      30    points.   
  The round continues with the remaining 75% of the probability. Player 1 selects an integer, 
Integer X, from integers 0 to 3H. Player 2 observes Integer X, and then selects either A or R. 
When A is selected:   
Player 1 is awarded      X + 30 – H  points.  
Player 2 is awarded      3H – X + 30 points.   
  When R is selected:   
Player 1 is awarded      30 – H   points.   
Player 2 is awarded      30    points.   
  Please consider that you are facing the following situation: Both “Player 1” and “Player 2” 
already have 30 points each. Player 1 discovers with a probability of 75% that there is a joint 
project, and if executed with an investment of H points, there is a prospect of gaining a total of 
3H points. Player 1 then indicates Proposal X to Player 2 for the distribution of these 3H points, 
which provides X points to Player 1 and the remaining points of 3H – X to Player 2. Player 2 
either accepts Proposal X (A) or rejects (R) it. If the proposal is accepted (A), the joint project 
will be executed and the 3H points will be distributed as indicated by Proposal X; if rejected (R), 
the joint project will not be executed and the 3H points will not be added.   
There is a 25% probability that Player 1 will not be able to find the joint project, even if an 
investment of H points is made. Whether the joint project can be found or not is determined by 
probability, with each Round being independent from the others. Look at the following diagram 
to verify how the points are awarded. The investment of H points is deducted from the points 




As soon as the experiment starts, you will be assigned the role of either Player 1 or Player 2, 
and you will remain in that role to make decisions until the first 10 rounds have been completed. 
Then the players will switch roles and the person who was Player 1 becomes Player 2, and vice 




Player 1    X + 30 – H   points
Player 2    3H – X + 30   points
Player 1    30 – H   points 
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note that the partner you are paired up with will be selected randomly and change for each 
round. 
Those who have any questions, please quietly raise your hand.   
 
Descriptions of screen displays and operations for computers 
 
Please look at the booklet with computer screen images printed.   
Please look at Screen 9 where Player 1 selects a number for H. Click to select one integer 
from among 0, 10, 20, and 30 in the section at the lower right section of the screen where 
decision-making operations are performed, then click the OK button within the stipulated time 
of 18 seconds. Once Integer H has been selected, this Round finishes with a probability of 25% 
and continues with a probability of 75%.  
Please look at Screen 10 to verify if the Round is finished or will be continued. In this 
example, it shows that the Round will continue. After 3 seconds, the display automatically 
moves onto the next screen.   
Please look at Screen 11 where Player 1 selects a number for X. Look at the archive of past 
rounds displayed on the left side of the screen, which indicates if each Round was immediately 
finished or continued after the value for H was selected. The value of H selected by Player 1 for 
the current Round is shown on the right side of the screen. In this example, the value selected 
for H is 20; therefore, the additional points for the joint project are 3H = 60 points. Enter Integer 
X inside the frame of the box for entries using single-byte numbers between 0 and 60 and then 
click the OK button in the lower right section within the stipulated 18 seconds. 
Please look at Screen 12 where Player 2 selects either A or R. The value of H and X 
selected by Player 1 for the current Round are shown on the right side of the screen. In this 
example, H is 20 and X is 45, and it shows that if A is selected, Player 1 will be awarded X + 30 
– H = 45 + 30 – 20 = 55 points, while Player 2 will be awarded 3H – X + 30 = 60 – 45 + 30 = 
45 points. Click to select either A or R, then click OK within the stipulated 18 seconds.   
The points awarded to you for the Round are displayed on a screen similar to that of Screen 
4. If Screen 10 displays immediately after the value of H is selected, then it indicates that the 
Round has finished; Screens 11 and 12 will not be displayed after Screen 10 and after 5 seconds, 
the display automatically moves onto the next Round. 




Experiment 5 comprises 20 Rounds and each Round will proceed in the following manner. 48 
 
Player 1 selects an integer, Integer H, from among 4 available integers 0, 10, 20, and 30. Once 
Integer H has been selected this Round immediately finishes with a probability of 25%, then: 
Player 1 is awarded      30 – H   points.   
Player 2 is awarded      30    points.   
   When the Round continues in the remaining 75% of the probability, Player 2 selects an 
integer, Integer Y, from integers 0 to 3H. Player 1 observes Integer Y, then selects either A or R. 
When A is selected:   
Player 1 is awarded      3H – Y + 30 – H  points.  
Player 2 is awarded      Y + 30    points.   
  When R is selected:   
Player 1 is awarded      30 - H   points.   
Player 2 is awarded      30    points.   
  Please consider that you are facing the following situation. Both “Player 1” and “Player 2” 
already have 30 points each. Player 1 discovers with a probability of 75% that there is a joint 
project and if executed with an investment of H points, there is a prospect of gaining a total of 
3H points. Player 2 discovers this and indicates Proposal Y for the distribution of 3H points, 
which provides Y points to Player 2 and the remaining points of 3H –Y to Player 1. It is not 
Player 1 who spent the awarded points for H points, but Player 2 who makes the proposal. 
Player 1 either accepts Proposal Y (A) or rejects (R) it. If the proposal is accepted (A), the joint 
project will be executed and the 3H points will be distributed as indicated by Proposal Y; if 
rejected (R), the joint project will not be executed and the 3H points will not be added.   
On the other hand, there is a 25% probability that Player 1 will not be able to find the joint 
project, even if an investment of H points is made. Whether the joint project can be found or not 
is determined by probability, with each Round being independent from the others. Look at the 
following diagram to verify how the points are awarded. The investment of H points is deducted 
from the points awarded to Player 1, regardless of whether or not the joint project is discovered 
and executed.   
 
 




Player 1    3H – Y + 30 – H points 
Player 2    Y + 30     points 
Player 1    30 – H   points 
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and will remain in that role to make decisions until the first 10 rounds have been completed. 
Then the players switch roles and the person who was Player 1 becomes Player 2, and vice 
versa, with the players proceeding with decision making in these switched roles for the next 10 
rounds. Please note that the partner you are paired up with will be selected randomly and change 
for each round.   
Those who have any questions, please quietly raise your hand.   
 
At this time, all of the experiments have been completed and all the points awarded to 
everyone are recorded on the computer. 
Please enter your details on a survey form that will now be distributed.   
Furthermore, please take out the bank remittance form from the envelope and enter the 
details accurately. Please note that unless all the necessary details are provided, we will not be 
able to pay you for your awarded amounts.   
Those who have any questions, please quietly raise your hand.   
Please verify that all your details are provided on the survey form and on the bank 
remittance form.   
Those who have any questions, please quietly raise your hand. 
Please place all the documents inside the envelope. You are welcome to take the memo 
paper with you. Please leave the ball-pointed pen and ink pad on the desk. Also make sure you 
take all your belongings with you when you leave. 
Please do not to talk about or divulge any details regarding today’s experiments to anyone 
until Saturday. Thank you very much for your participation. We will now ask you to leave in an 
orderly manner. 
First, the people in the two rows along the corridor side of the room please leave the room 
and then the people in the two rows in the middle of the room. Finally, the people in the two 
rows on the window side of the room please leave the room. 
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Appendix 4:   
Computer Screen Images 
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Screen 12 
 
 
 
 